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Abstract: Concert tickets can either be sold at a single price or at different prices to reflect 
the various levels of seating categories available. Here we consider how two product 
characteristics (the artist’s age and venue capacity) influence the likelihood that pop music 
concert tickets will be sold at different prices. We argue that valuation heterogeneity, and 
thus the returns to using price discrimination, are higher for older artists and in larger venues. 
We test this hypothesis in a large dataset of concerts. By singling out variations in the two 
characteristics that are exogenous to the decision to price discriminate, we show that these 
characteristics have a large and significant impact on the use of price discrimination.         
 
 
JEL:  D42, L82, Z11. 
 
Keywords: Price discrimination, second degree price discrimination, profit 
maximization. 
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1-Introduction  
Price discrimination is often introduced in economic textbooks as a way of stimulating 
the reader with vivid illustrations of the relevance of economic theory. Describing particular 
cases is one thing; but, ultimately, the theory should also be able to predict when firms will 
choose price discrimination rather than uniform pricing. This is a challenging task. One can 
easily think of instances of sellers who price discriminate in one market but then charge a 
uniform price in another market with similar features. Busse and Rysman (2005) and Clerides 
and Michis (2007) show that there is wide variation across markets and over time in the 
extent to which firms price discriminate. So how can economic theory help explain firms’ 
decisions concerning the pricing strategy they choose?   
We empirically study the determinants of second degree price discrimination in the 
popular music concert industry. This industry appealed to us for several reasons. To start 
with, Connolly and Krueger (2006) identify price discrimination as a key issue for future 
research, narrowing the question down to ‘What determines the amount of price 
discrimination within concerts?’ (2006, p. 63). We take up that question here as the focus of 
our study. Secondly, choosing the pop concert industry allows us to sidestep a problem 
typical of most applications in the literature, i.e., that price differences across products may 
be explained by variations in marginal cost rather than by price discrimination (Shepard 
(1991), Clerides (2004)). In our application, since variable costs are zero, this ambiguity does 
not occur. Finally, the concert industry offers a uniquely rich set of pricing policies set by 
independent firms under different market conditions.   
We say that an artist price discriminates if seats at a given event are sold at different 
prices. In our sample, about 25 percent of the events offer uniform pricing (general 
admission) while the others use price discrimination (with at least two different prices 
  1corresponding to multiple seating categories). The main objective of this paper is to 
determine whether economic theory can help explain the decision to use price discrimination. 
The analysis proceeds in two steps.   
First, we present a theoretical argument for why older artists and those performing in 
larger venues are more likely to price discriminate, ceteris paribus. Briefly stated, the 
intuition is that larger venues offer a greater variety of product quality (e.g., one of the main 
dimensions of quality, the distance to the stage, varies more within larger venues), and that 
older artists perform for an older and more diverse audience that is willing to pay more for 
quality.   
We then provide evidence consistent with our main hypothesis. A key issue is whether we 
can single out exogenous variability in the age of the artist and venue capacity. We present 
theoretical arguments to support exogeneity in our empirical specification and also leverage 
the richness of our panel dataset to investigate robustness to many sources of potential 
endogeneity. 
Surprisingly few studies have tried to test price discrimination theory (Stole, 2008).  
There are two notable exceptions. Verboven (1999) rejects a prediction on product line mark-
ups and Nevo and Wolfram (2001) reject a simple comparative static prediction. These 
findings are not surprising, given that the industries considered were oligopolistic. In 
contrast, the concert industry much more closely resembles the textbook case of monopoly 




Throughout this paper, we follow the literature and interpret the practice of selling 
vertically differentiated goods (seat quality) as screening under second degree price 
  2discrimination a la Mussa-Rosen. Strictly speaking, it could also be consistent with monopoly 
pricing in independent market segments, and the distinction is that, under the latter 
interpretation, there is no substitution across seating categories.  This is debatable, and some 
economists would argue that both rationales correspond to price discrimination to the extent 
that, in both cases, the monopolist sells products with identical variable costs at different 
prices (Clerides, 2004).  In any event, the distinction between these two rationales for price 
differentiation is not relevant for our work, because our main predictions hold independently. 
Keeping this nuance in mind, the contribution of this paper is to test whether sellers respond 
to price discrimination opportunities; we leave the question of whether differentiated pricing 
in our case study is an illustration of strict second degree price discrimination (in the sense 
that the sorting constraint binds) for future research.    
A firm is expected to price discriminate when the cost of implementing price 
discrimination is lower than the increase in net revenue. In our case study, such costs may 
include the cost of adding a seating category, printing different tickets, segmenting the venue 
and enforcing property rights over seats (Miravete, 2007). The return to price discrimination 
depends on the cost function and on the distribution of consumer preferences (Anderson and 
Dana, 2008). One consideration specific to concert ticket pricing is that most costs are fixed 
and the physical space in each venue constrains the number of seats that can be offered in 
each category. This constraint is the key to our identification strategy.    
 
Seller’s decision to price discriminate 
We borrow Rosen and Rosenfield’s (1997) model of ticket pricing to express the seller’s 
decision to price discriminate as a function of given characteristics such as venue capacity 
and consumer demand. A venue of capacity K can be split into ns seats of quality s, s=l,h, 
where ns is such that nl+nh=K. There are two types of consumers. Consumer θ=L,H values v
θ
s 
















l. As in the standard 
model of price discrimination, consumers value the high quality good more, the high type 
values any quality more than the low type, and the high type values an increment in quality 
more than the low type. For now, θ is left unspecified. In the empirical analysis, we will 
assume that θ=H represents an older (wealthier) and less price-sensitive public. There are not 
enough high types to fill the entire venue, but there are enough to fill the high quality seats. 
We do not consider the option of selling only high quality seats to the high types and leaving 
many seats unsold, because this is not realistic in the pop concert industry, where venues are 
often sold-out.   
Under price discrimination, the monopolist fully extracts the surplus of the low type 
consumers, pl= v
L
















The first term in the RHS corresponds to the profits under uniform pricing, Π
m=Kv
L
l, since in 
order to sell-out, the monopolist cannot charge more than v
L
l. The gain from using price 
discrimination is ΔΠ=Π
d-Π
m-C, where C captures the fixed cost of implementing price 





l)-C       (1). 
The monopolist price discriminates when this expression is positive. It is now clear that the 
specific feature of our application, that the distribution of seat quality is exogenously given, 
greatly simplifies the expression of ΔΠ.
2
                                                           
2 The main point is that production costs are absent in (1); only implementation costs 
influence the decision to price discriminate. In addition, (1) requires only comparing 
differences in willingness to pay for quality within individuals (not across individuals).  
To illustrate this point, consider the standard model of quality price discrimination 
where quantities are endogenous (Mussa and Rosen, 1978). Assume that there are nθ 
consumers of type θ, and to make the analysis comparable to the one above, assume 
  4 
Hypothesis 
Assume that one observes concerts with different pricing policies. The theory predicts 
that price discrimination should take place when ΔΠ>0. For any given concert, however, the 
econometrician cannot observe both Π
d and Π
m and therefore cannot observe ΔΠ.  But ΔΠ is 
a function of demand and product characteristics, some of which are observed, and others of 
which are unobserved. Call the set of observed characteristics X.  We can test the theory 
under two assumptions. First, for characteristic x in a subset X1⊂X, ∂ΔΠ/∂x is monotone in x. 
That is, we can sign the impact of the variables in X1 on ΔΠ. Without loss of generality, we 
assume ∂ΔΠ/∂x>0. The second assumption requires that, conditional upon X, the unobserved 
characteristics are not correlated with x. When these two assumptions hold, a test of the 
theory is   
(∂/∂x)Pr(PD=1⎢X)>0, for x∈X1         ( 2 )  
where PD is a dummy variable equal to one if price discrimination is used (ΔΠ>0).
3 The 
impact of x on the probability of price discrimination can then be estimated using limited 
dependent variable models, and hypothesis (2) can be tested. 
An observable variable in X may not qualify for testing the theory because (a) the theory 
does not allow signing ∂ΔΠ/∂x or (b) because it is correlated with unobserved variables that 
also influence ΔΠ, thus introducing an omitted variable problem. This latter point is subtle. 
Consider, for example, a measure of demand heterogeneity such as income inequality. Many 
                                                                                                                                                                           
again that selling only to high types is never optimal. Under uniform pricing, it is now 









l) >0 which requires comparing within individual 
willingness to pay for quality across individuals.   
3 Conditional on X, PD is also a function of the unobserved characteristics. Under a 
structural approach, one would specify a joint density and integrate over these 
characteristics to obtain the probability of using price discrimination. Pr(PD=1) in (2) is 
a reduced form expression that omits this underlying structure.   
  5specifications of consumer preferences imply that ΔΠ increases with income inequality 
(condition a is satisfied). But income inequality is likely to be correlated with other 
unobserved variables that also influence ΔΠ, and condition (b) is violated. For example, 
income inequality may be correlated with income level (larger cities have higher average 
income and higher income inequality) and with other unobserved demand characteristics that 
influence ΔΠ and that vary across cities, thereby preventing the researcher from identifying 
the predicted impact of income inequality on price discrimination, from a sample of concerts 
taking place in different cities. 
In the rest of this paper, we argue that the above two conditions hold for two variables: 
the artist’s age (A) and venue capacity (K). We will now propose an economic argument to 
sign ∂ΔΠ/∂x, waiting to take up the issue of exogeneity until after having presented the case 
study and the variables in X. 
The impact of venue size on the return to price discrimination 
The prediction that increasing venue size increases the return to price discrimination 
holds so long as the quality differences across seats within a venue is positively correlated 
with venue size. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that the distance to the stage 
determines differentiation in seating quality. This assumption is without loss of generality if 
all the seats are identical and people only care about the distance to the stage. Even if there 
are additional dimensions of quality within a venue (e.g., standing room, regular seating, 
private balconies), heterogeneity in these dimensions is also likely to increase with venue 
size. In the context of the model, our assumption means that K is increased by adding seats 
farther away from the stage and therefore of lower quality. As K increases, the monopolist 
continues to sell to the nh high types (which is fixed) while increasing sales to low types. The 
average quality of the seats in the low section decreases, and the high types’ willingness to 




l) increases. We conclude that ΔΠ increases 
with K.
4
The impact of the age of the artist on the return to price discrimination 
Two arguments suggest that age should increase the return to price discrimination, and 
both are based on the observation that the type of fans an artist has are determined largely by 
his/her age. First, there is ample anecdotal evidence that an artist’s audience remains loyal 
over the artist’s entire career. Fans make up a significant portion of the audience and form 
communities of devotees to particular musical styles or performers.
5 More systematic 
evidence points to the same conclusion. Empirical research in social psychology 
demonstrates that preferences for popular music are formed during a critical period of 
development associated with late adolescence and early adulthood and these preferences tend 
to prevail for the rest of one’s life (Holbrook and Schindler (1989) and North and Hargreaves 
(1995)). This implies that young artists, singing to young crowds, acquire a fan base which 
then follows them throughout their career.
6 Over time, the artist’s audience grows wealthier, 
and variability in earnings increases. In the language of the model, this can be described by 





implies that the return to price discrimination increases with age. 
                                                           
4 A more general model would allow the monopolist to split a continuum of seats of different 
qualities into two categories, thereby endogenizing nh.  This could be done, for example, by 
assuming that there exists a continuum of types who self-select between low and high 
categories.  The impact of adjusting nh in response to an increase in K, however, has a second 
order effect on ΔΠ and therefore on the decision to price discriminate. 
5 The fandom phenomenon is related to the formation of social identities and has lasting 
consequences on preferences over music (Shuker, 2005). 
6 This is consistent with the observation that “demographics are partly responsible for 
the continued success of performers as diverse as the Rolling Stones, Bonnie Raitt, and 
Bob Dylan...  This concert attendance is usually to ‘revisit’ the surviving performers---
and their music---of the ageing fans’ own generation.” (Shuker 2005, p.194).  This 
phenomenon is known in the industry as ‘nostalgia rock’ or ‘adult-oriented rock’ and it 
also holds for other musical styles such as country music (Sweetland, 2003). 
  7Secondly, young artists generally do not appeal to older generations, while older artists 
can appeal to young and old alike. Young rappers, for example, attract mostly young fans, 
while older artists who are part of the classic rock generation are constantly being 
rediscovered by younger generations.
7,8 This implies that older artists are more likely to play 
for a more heterogeneous audience in terms of age and other dimensions. The return to price 
discrimination increases as the audience grows more diverse, because older and less price-
sensitive individuals are more likely to buy high quality seats.
9 To conclude, both channels 
(ageing audience and more heterogeneous age composition of the audience) suggest that the 
return to price discrimination increases with the age of the artist. 
The above discussion suggests that (holding everything else constant) price 





Our main dataset, which was collected by Billboard, covers over 21,000 concerts by the 
largest 100 sellers or artists in the industry over the 1992-2005 period.  For each concert 
                                                           
7 This is consistent with the revival hypothesis stating that younger generations re-
discover the music of older generations starting with recent ones and moving back in 
time (North and Hargreaves, 1995). 
8 Music professional report that “the younger audience might come in from listening to 
new bands like Razolight, then work their way backwards towards what we now think of 
as classic bands like The Police, or The Jam, and then further back to The Who and Led 
Zeppelin” (Music Week, 2007).   
9 Waddell et al. (2007, p.51) report that “older, less price-sensitive audiences (…) 
paying more for tickets appreciate having their own piece of ‘real-estate’ in a seat, but 
often they are adverse to a lawn or general admission situation. These fans like to know 
exactly where they will be and do not find sitting or standing in the grass appealing.” 
10 The impacts of K and A on Pr(PD=1) do not have a structural interpretation, since we 
have not specified how these variables enter the primitives of the model and have not 
specified the structure that generates variations in PD (variables unobserved by the 
econometrician that influence the decision to price discriminate; see footnote 3).   
  8defined by a date, venue, and artist(s), we observe the different prices offered, and the 
capacity available.   
 In our sample, 56 percent of the concerts offer two price categories, 25 percent one, 15 
percent three, and the other 4 percent offer four categories. To define our dependent variable, 
we say that a seller price discriminates (PD=1) if she does not offer all tickets at the same 
price. This definition cuts the sample between unsophisticated pricing (general admission) 
and sophisticated pricing (differentiated seating).   
The two explanatory variables of interest are defined as follows. We measure A using the 
age of the performing artist when there is a single performer, or of the main performer when 
there are multiple artists in an act. For bands, we define A as the age of the band’s main 
performer. In principle, one could consider alternative measures of age, such as the year the 
band was formed, or the year of the artist’s first success.
11 This would imply a change in the 
level of the age variable. In practice, this is of secondary concern for most of our 
specifications because we control for artist fixed effects, and the coefficient on A will be 
estimated only from the within artist variations in age.      
Venue capacity (K) is defined as the number of seats available for a concert. K may vary 
from venue to venue, but also from concert to concert in the same venue (as will be seen in 
the discussion of Table 1 Panel 5) because the capacity available for a given event depends 
on the interaction between stage design (playing in front of the audience versus a 360º stage) 
and the physical space of the venue. 
Panel 1 in Table 1 presents summary statistics on our two explanatory variables and 
shows that there is much variability in artist age and venue capacity in our sample.  The mean 
                                                           
11 The empirical literature on the psychology of music has used different variables to 
measure the artist’s peak influence on preferences (for example, a first hit single and 
best selling song). These variables are highly correlated with one another and with the 
age of the artist.  In our sample, the correlation between the artist’s age and the act’s age 
(the time since the act or band was formed) is 0.87. 
  9age across all concerts is 43 years, with a standard deviation of 11 years. The mean venue 
size is 13,000 seats with a standard deviation of 8,800. Panels 2-5 document variations in age 
and capacity variables when holding artist, city, city-year and venue constant; these are the 
control variables to be included in X as we explain shortly. Consider Panel 2 on artists. We 
observe an average of 275 concerts per artist. We observe artists for a relatively long period 
(the average difference between the first and last concert by a given artist is 11 years), as 
required in order to test our prediction on age holding artist characteristics constant.
12 The 
standard deviation of capacity for a given artist is 12,000 seats, approximately 97 percent of 
the average capacity in our sample. Panels 3-5 reveal that there is also significant variability 
in artist age and venue capacity when one looks at a given city, a given city in a given year, 
and even a given venue. Of particular interest, we observe an average of about 53 different 
concerts in the same venue, with substantial variations in available capacity (Panel 5).  We 
can leverage this feature to test H1 at the venue level. 
 
4-Empirical strategy and results 
Figures 1 and 2 respectively plot the average frequency of price discrimination against 
venue capacity and artist’s age. Averages are computed for intervals of 1,000 seats for venue 
capacity and one year for artist’s age. These two figures show that the frequency of price 
discrimination increases with venue size (K) and with age (A). These findings are consistent 
with hypotheses H1 and H2, respectively.  However, A and K could be correlated with other 
characteristics that also affect the use of price discrimination. 
A test of our hypothesis should involve a set of variables X, such that holding X constant, 
variations in A and K are independent of any other variable that also influences the decision 
                                                           
12 In addition, artists play in different years (starting date, ending date, and years off vary 
across artists), implying that we can control for time trends in the use of price 
discrimination.   
  10to price discriminate.  If this is the case, the omitted variable problem discussed earlier will 
not bias the inference. Consider first the issue of the artist’s age. One could argue that the 
artists who are older on average in our sample play different styles of music or appeal to 
different audiences.  H2 may not hold across artists due to unobserved heterogeneity at the 
artist level.  By controlling for artist fixed effects, we can test H2 at the artist level. We test 
whether a given artist, performing at different stages in her career, is more likely to price 
discriminate when she is older. Still, one may argue that older artists sing in different cities, 
to leverage changes in their fan base. The endogeneity in the choice of markets that are 
served can be controlled for by controlling for city fixed effects. Another concern is that artist 
age is correlated with time, and the amount of price discrimination has changed over time 
(Connolly and Kruger, 2006). Introducing a time trend in X eliminates this concern.      
Consider the issue of venue size (H1). As argued above, we should control for city fixed 
effects to account for possible endogeneity in city choice. One may argue that there are also 
some unobserved venue characteristics that lower the cost of implementing price 
discrimination (the existence of well-defined seating sections) and that are correlated with 
venue size. Alternatively, larger venues may be located in areas (within a city) that exclude 
some audience members, due to transportation constraints. To control for such unobserved 
venue heterogeneity, we control for venue fixed effects, which is possible because the 
capacity available at a given venue varies across concerts.  
 
Estimation results: tests of H1 and H2 
We estimate the impact of age and venue size on the probability of observing price 
discrimination using a linear probability model.  
PDi=α0+ α1Ai+ α2Ki+ Xiα3+Φiα4+εi   (3) 
  11where PDi is equal to one if price discrimination is used and zero otherwise; Xi is a vector of 
control variables; Φi is a vector including a combination of artist, city, year, and venue 
indicator variables (dummies) to control for unobserved heterogeneity; and εi is the 
idiosyncratic error term for concert i, such that E(ε|A, K, X, Φ)=0. The results are not 
affected when we estimate specification (3) using a logit model (the logit marginal effects are 
reported in the appendix).   
The first three columns in Table 2 correspond to different specifications with different 
sets of dummies in Φ. Column 1, which does not include any additional control variables, 
shows that our two main variables, artist age and venue capacity, still have a positive impact 
on the probability to price discriminate after we allow for correlation between the two 
variables. In addition, it shows that the effect is statistically significant.   
In column 2, we add artist dummies, and the magnitude of the artist age coefficient 
increases. This suggests that the within-artist response to age is greater than the across-artist 
response. Adding the city dummies in column 3 does not change the coefficient on artist age, 
but it does reduce the coefficient on venue capacity. This is consistent with the conjecture 
that larger venues are located in larger cities with more heterogeneous populations and thus 
greater resort to price discrimination. Still, the coefficient on venue capacity remains positive 
and significant, as predicted under H1. In column 4, we consider the possibility of artist 
specific local demands by adding artist-city dummies. The main conclusions are unaffected.   
Table 2, column 5 replaces the city dummies with venue dummies to control for 
unobserved venue heterogeneity in addition to local market heterogeneity. Variation in 
capacity within a given venue is driven by the interaction between the stage design and the 
venue characteristics. For example, an artist who plays at the center of the stadium (360°) 
typically has to eliminate more seats than an artist who plays with a more conventional stage 
design. Such choices depend on the artist’s preferences and constraints dictated by the 
  12characteristics of the venue. This interaction at the stage-venue level generates exogenous 
variability in the number of seats that can actually be used in each venue. We restrict to a sub-
sample of venues with a large standard deviation in venue size (at least 25 percent of the 
mean venue capacity). The coefficient on venue size does not change, suggesting that our 
previous results were not driven by unobserved venue heterogeneity.   
 
Time trend 
Systematic changes over time in the use of price discrimination may have taken place 
during our sample period. In table 3 column 1, we add a linear time trend in addition to city 
dummies.  The two coefficients of interests do not change, but the coefficient on artist age 
decreases.  In addition, the coefficient of the time trend is positive and significant.
13 We also 
consider the possibility of city specific time trends in column 2, but the results are unaffected.   
A concern with these specifications is that we cannot include artist dummies. If we did so, 
we would not be able to separately identify the time trend and the effect of artist ageing 
(because these two variables and artist dummies are multi-collinear). However, note that the 
introduction of artist dummies in Table 2, column 2 increased rather than reduced the impact 
of artist age. This suggests that, if anything, artist unobserved heterogeneity may bias the 
estimate of ageing downwards. Unfortunately, there is no definitive solution to this 
identification problem. Nonetheless, we can make some progress by pursuing two strategies. 
First, note that the issue of time trend cannot bias the estimate of the venue size (K) 
effect. In fact, having both artist dummies and the ageing effect implies that these two set of 
coefficients control for the possible existence of a time trend. We can even show that non-
                                                           
13 Connolly and Krueger (2006) show that the percentage of concerts charging uniform 
prices for all seats fell between 1980 and 2000, but they do not control for artist age or 
for artist fixed effects, and focus on the subset of concerts with 25,000 seats or more; a 
subset that is largely under-represented in our sample.   
  13linear time effects do not affect our inference, by including artist and year dummies (Table 3, 
column 3). The coefficient for venue capacity does not change and remains significant.   
Second, we look for the existence of non-linear effects of age. Although the linear 
component of the age variable cannot be separately identified from a time trend once we 
control for artist fixed effects, we can still separately identify its non-linear component. The 
objective is no longer that of measuring the impact of ageing on the use of price 
discrimination, but rather of testing whether ageing affects the probability of price 
discrimination in a non-linear fashion. 
There are two ways to motivate this approach. First, we can test for the existence of any 
non-linear age effect, suspending judgment concerning the relationship between A and the 
likelihood to price discriminate. Demonstrating the existence of non-linearities shows that A 
matters, as predicted by H2. Second, we can go back to the theoretical model and derive a 
prediction on the second derivative of the likelihood to price discriminate with respect to A. 
The basic intuition is that the probability to price discriminate is bounded from above, so the 
increasing relationship has to be concave for some values of A. In addition, we speculate that 
the impact of age on the probability to price discriminate is highest for relatively young 
artists, and then decreases with age because the largest increase in heterogeneity of fans is 
likely related to entry of an artist’s audience into the labor force.   
In Table 3, column 4, we add the age of the artist squared to the specification used in 
column 3. The coefficient of age squared is significantly different from zero at conventional 
confidence levels, suggesting the existence of non-linearities. In addition, the coefficient is 
negative, which is consistent with the hypothesis that the marginal impact of age is 
decreasing. In the next subsection, we allow for general non-linear specifications and show 
that the concavity of the relation is robust. 
 
  14Non-linear specifications 
We investigate in greater detail the possibility of non-linearities in the impact of artist age 
and venue size on the probability to price discriminate. We respectively classify the data into 
11 groups based on venue size and 9 groups according to the age of the main artist.
14 We then 
create one indicator variables for each group and replace the variables measuring age and 
venue size with these indicator variables in our linear probability model, including artist, city 
and year dummies (the excluded groups are for ages under 20, for capacity between 0 and 
2,000 seats, and for the year 1992). Because the model is fully saturated (it includes only 
dummy variables for mutually exclusive groups for age, venue size, artist, city and year), 
there is no loss of generality using a linear probability model instead of a non-linear model 
such as the logit. In fact, the predicted probabilities are simply the average frequency of price 
discrimination for each combination of the dummy variables and cannot be outside the unit 
interval. Figure 3 and 4 plot the estimated coefficients, which are also reported in Table 4, 
column 1. 
Figure 3 shows that the linear specifications in Table 2 and 3 do not conceal decreasing 
relations over significant intervals of venue capacity, even after controlling for the time trend. 
Figure 4 shows that the age of the artist has an impact on the probability to price discriminate 
after controlling for year fixed effects (this includes the possibility of a linear trend in the 
adoption of price discrimination). The coefficients for the age categories are all significantly 
different from zero at 10 percent confidence interval, with the exception of the age interval 
above 55, and jointly different from zero at conventional levels. The greatest marginal impact 
of age is very early in the career of an artist, between the “under 20” and the “20-25 years of 
age” categories. The probability to price discriminate is highest between the ages of 45 and 
                                                           
14 Each age group covers five years, from 20 to 55, plus two additional category for 
artists younger than 20 and older than 55.  Venue size groups cover 2,000 seats each, 
from 0 to 20,000, plus an additional category for capacity larger than 20,000 seats.  
  1550, with a small decline for the last category, 55 and up. This relation is generally consistent 
with the increasing and concave relation identified in the previous table.  
 
Additional robustness 
One concern is that our age variable may reflect other trends related to the artist life-
cycle. One may argue, for example, that older artists acquire experience with their audience 
and learn how to price discriminate over time.
15 Artists may sell to the same consumers 
throughout their careers (no change in valuation heterogeneity) and still price discriminate 
only when they get older because they then know more about their audience composition.  
Since experience is correlated with age, it could bias our inference about the relation between 
age and the use of price discrimination.   
Under the experience interpretation, however, artists would be more likely to price 
discriminate in markets where they have played more in the recent past. Holding experience 
constant, proxied by the number of concerts offered in a market in the past five years, for 
example, we can measure the impact of age on the probability to price discriminate. In Table 
4, column 2, we include in the regression the number of concerts performed by the same band 
in the same city in the previous 5 years and the coefficient on artist age does not change 
relative to Table 2 column 3. The experience variable has a negative impact on the 
probability of price discrimination, but this result is driven by a small number of observations 
with large value for experience. If one drops the one percent of observations with larger 
values of the experience variable, the results are not significant. This suggests that, in general, 
local experience with one’s audience does not significantly influence the decision to price 
discriminate.   
                                                           
15 A related point is that concerts are experience goods and that, over time, fans learn 
how interested they are in a band.  The amount of heterogeneity in valuation increases 
with the artist’s past playing frequency. 
  16There may be other changes that take place over the artist’s life-cycle that affect the 
heterogeneity of the audience and thus the decision to price discriminate. For example,  
systematic changes in the artist’s repertoire could have an independent impact on audience 
composition. We cannot exclude that such changes also contribute to the relationship between 
artist age and the likelihood to use price discrimination.  
 
Economics significance 
Venue capacity can have a significant impact on the likelihood to use price discrimination 
in our sample. For example, the non-linear estimate (presented in Figure 3), suggests that 
moving from a 5,000 seat venue to an 18,000 seat venue increases the probability to price 
discriminate by 13 percent. Using the more conservative coefficient from the linear model 
(0.003 in Table 2, column 3 and Table 3) suggests an increase of about 4 percent.   
We find evidence that ageing influences the decision to price discriminate. We cannot, 
however, measure the linear impact of ageing unless we make some assumption on the type 
of unobserved heterogeneity that may be present. Under the assumption that there is no time 
trend, an upper bound is that the probability to price discriminate increases by 25 percent 
every 10 years (Table 2). Assuming that there is a time trend, but excluding the possibility for 
artists’ unobserved heterogeneity, gives an estimate of 8 percent (Table 3).  
 
4-Summary 
This paper uses a large dataset on concerts for popular music to investigate whether 
sellers are more likely to use 2
nd degree price discrimination when it is more profitable to do 
so. The theory predicts that older artists and artists performing in larger venues should be 
more likely to price discriminate.  The intuition is that larger venues imply greater differential 
in product quality and older artists face older audiences with more diverse age distribution 
  17(both young and old audience members).  The evidence shows that venue capacity and artist 
age increase the probability of using price discrimination as predicted by the theory.   
This study leaves several questions for future research. First, it would be interesting to 
review the trend in the use of price discrimination by measuring changes in the magnitude of 
price discrimination. One way to measure the intensity of price discrimination would be to 
use the difference between the maximum and minimum prices for a given concert, as in 
Connolly and Kruger (2006). Second, although most artists use just one or two seating 
categories, some artists use three or even four. Investigating what determines the number of 
seating categories raises new theoretical and econometric issues that are beyond the scope of 
this paper.  
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Note: venue size is reported on the horizontal axis. Data grouped by venue size, intervals of 1,000 seats up to 
19,000; then 20,000 and larger. 
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Note: Age of the artist is reported on the horizontal axis. Concerts with artist younger than 23 are grouped 
in one category. 
  22Figure 3: The impact of venue size on the probability of price discrimination, controlling 
for artist, city and year fixed effects. 
 
 
Note: the figure reports the estimated coefficients of a linear probability model with indicator variables for 
10 venue size brackets (and a 90 percent confidence interval). The model also includes indicator variables 
for 8 age brackets, artist, city and year dummies. Each age group covers 2,000 seat intervals, 0 to 20,000 
seats, plus one additional category for venues larger than 20,000. On the horizontal axis we report the 
midpoint of the interval for each category. The omitted category is for venue size between 0 and 2,000. 
Venues larger than 20,000 are grouped together and assigned a value of 22,000. 
  23 
Figure 4: The impact of age on the probability of price discrimination, controlling for 
artist, city and year fixed effects. 
 
 
Note: the figure reports the estimated coefficients of a linear probability model with indicator variables for 
8 age brackets (and 90 percent confidence interval). The model also includes indicator variables for 10 
venue size brackets, artist, city and year dummies. Each age group covers five-year intervals from 20 to 
55, plus two additional categories for artists under 20 and over 55. The midpoint of the interval for each 
category is reported on the horizontal axis. The over-55 category is assigned a value of 57.5. The under-20 
category (omitted in the regression) is assigned a value of 17.5.  
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Table 1. Variability in the age of the artist and venue capacity within artist, city, year, venue 
and artist-city pairs (18,285 observations). 
  mean sd  p10 p25 p50 p75 p90 
Overall Sample          
Age of the artist  43  11  29  35  43  51  56 
Size of the venue  12,988  8,895  3,436  7,131  12,037  17,016  20,236 
 
Within-artist variability 
        
Number of observations for 
each artist  275  135  126 184 260  339  396 
Career length 
(Max age - min age)  11  3  6  11  12  13  13 
Capacity- (mean capacity)   0  12,576  -9,139  -5,612  -1,943  3,198  10,101 
 
Within-city variability 
        
Number of observations  128  91  19  57  112  186  270 
Age - (mean age)  0  10  -14  -8  1  8  13 
Capacity - (mean capacity)   0  12,576  -9,139  -5,612  -1,943  3,198  10,101 
 
Within-city-year variability 
        
Number of observations  11  8  2  5  9  15  20 
Age – (mean age)  0  9  -12  -6  0  7  12 
Capacity – (mean capacity)   0  11,688  -9,214  -3,852  -144  1,578  6,602 
 
Within-venue variability 
        
Number of observations  53  45  5  17  43  78  113 
Age – (mean age)  0  10  -13  -7  0  7  12 
Capacity – (mean capacity)   0  9,418  -6,013  -2,598  -437  796  3,986 
  
  25Table 2. The impact of the age of the artist and size of the venue on price discrimination 
(linear probability model) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
          
Artist’s age  0.011***  0.024***  0.023***  0.021***  0.023*** 
 (0.000)  (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.002)  (0.004) 
Venue size (/1,000)  0.0058***  0.0072***  0.0031***  0.0037***  0.003* 
 (0.0014)  (0.0016)  (0.0012)  (0.0015)  (0.002) 
Artist f.e.?    Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
City f.e.?      Yes  Yes   
Artist-City f.e.?        Yes   
Venue f.e.?          Yes 
Observations 18,285  18,285  18,285  18,285  4,483 
R-squared 0.09  0.30  0.40  0.74  0.55 
Note: The dependent variable is equal to one if more than one price category is used and otherwise equal to 
zero. In column 5, we consider only venues whose standard deviation of venue capacity is at least 25 percent of 
the mean capacity of the venue. In column 4 we include dummy variables for pairs of artists and cities. Robust 
standard errors in parentheses, clustered by venue. The logit marginal effects are reported in the appendix. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
  26 
Table 3. The impact of the age of the artist and size of the venue on price discrimination: 
additional results (linear probability model) 
 (1)  (2)  (3)  (4) 
        
Artist’s age  0.0088***  0.008***     
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)     
Venue size (/1,000)  0.0023**  0.0029***  0.0031***  0.0027** 
 (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.0012)  (0.0012) 
Year 0.0177***       
 (0.0015)       
Artist’s age squared        -0.000302*** 
       (0.000063) 
Artist f.e.?      Yes  Yes 
City f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year f.e.?      Yes  Yes 
City specific trend?    Yes     
Observations 18,285  18,285  18,285  18,285 
R-squared 0.38  0.30  0.41  0.41 
Note: The dependent variable is equal to one if more than one price category is used and otherwise equal 
to zero. The variable Year takes integer values between 1992 and 2005. When a city specific trend is 
included, we add the interactions between Year and the city dummy variables. Robust standard errors are 
in parentheses, clustered by venue. The logit marginal effects are reported in the appendix. * significant at 
10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
  27Table 4. The impact of the age of the artist and size of the venue on price discrimination: 
controlling for previous experience and semi-parametric specification (linear probability 
model) 
 (1)  (2) 
Artist’s age    0.024*** 
   (0.002) 
Venue size (/1,000)    0.002 
   (0.002) 
Number of concerts by the same band 
in the same city (in previous 5 years) 
  
-0.002*** 
   (0.004) 
Artist’s age squared     
    
Age 20-25  0.117***   
 (0.031)   
Age 25-30  0.128**   
 (0.050)   
Age 30-35  0.130**   
 (0.055)   
Age 35-40  0.112*   
 (0.060)   
Age 40-45  0.116*   
 (0.065)   
Age 45-50  0.156**   
 (0.070)   
Age 50-55  0.157**   
 (0.074)   
Age 55 plus  0.100   
 (0.081)   
Venue size 2,000-4,000  0.002   
 (0.035)   
Venue size 4,000-6,000  0.074**   
 (0.037)   
Venue size 6,000-8,000  0.101***   
 (0.037)   
Venue size 8,000-10,000  0.114***   
 (0.036)   
Venue size 10,000-12,000  0.157***   
 (0.037)   
Venue size 12,000-14,000  0.179***   
 (0.037)   
Venue size 14,000-16,000  0.198***   
 (0.037)   
Venue size 16,000-18,000  0.196***   
 (0.037)   
Venue size 18,000-20,000  0.215***   
 (0.038)   
Venue size 20,000 plus  0.190***   
 (0.038)   
Artist f.e.?  Yes  Yes 
City f.e.?  Yes  Yes 
Year f.e.?  Yes   
Observations 18,285  12,512 
R-squared 0.43  0.42 
Note: The dependent variable is equal to one if more than one price category is used and otherwise equal 
to zero. In column 1, we include dummy variables for 8 intervals of the age variable, and 10 dummy 
variables for venue size. The estimated coefficients and the 90 percent confidence intervals are reported in 
Figure 3-4. In column 2, we only consider concerts after 1996. Robust standard errors in parentheses, 
clustered by venue. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%.
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Table A1. The impact of the age of the artist and size of the venue on price discrimination 
(logit marginal effects) 
  (1)  (2)  (3) (4) (5) 
         
Artist’s  age  0.011***  0.025***  0.023*** 0.069*** 0.028*** 
  (0.000)  (0.002)  (0.001) (0.005) (0.004) 
Venue size 
(/1,000) 
0.007*** 0.007***  0.002**  0.0068**  0.0037* 
 (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.001)  (0.0037)  (0.0023) 
Artist  f.e.?    Yes  Yes Yes Yes 
City f.e.?      Yes  Yes   
Artist-City  f.e.?       Yes  
Venue f.e.?          Yes 
         
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by venue. In column 5, we consider only venues 
whose standard deviation of venue capacity is at least 25 percent of the mean capacity of the venue. 
Marginal effects computed at the mean of the independent variables.  * significant at 10%; ** significant 
at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
 
Table A2. Additional results (logit marginal effects) 
  (1) (2) (3)  (4) 
        
Artist’s age  0.009***  0.0090***    0.021*** 
 (0.0004)  (0.0004)    (0.002) 
Venue size (/1,000)  0.002**  0.0020***  0.0024***  0.002* 
 (0.001)  (0.0010)  (0.0010)  (0.001) 
Year 0.018***       
 (0.0013)       
Number of concerts by the same 
band in the same city (in previous 
5 years) 
     
 
0.002 
       (0.003) 
Artist’s age squared         
        
Artist f.e.?      Yes  Yes 
City f.e.?  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year f.e.?      Yes   
City specific trend?    Yes     
        
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses, clustered by venue. Marginal effects computed at the mean of 
the independent variables. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. 
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